Irregular Warfare Podcast

Nuclear weapons may make direct war between major powers less likely, but they do not end competition. Instead, they push states toward indirect forms of conflict: proxy warfare, security force assistance, covert action, and cyber operations.

The guests discuss why indirect conflict is so attractive in an era of nuclear risk, how this logic applies to Ukraine and Taiwan, and what it means for US-China competition. They also consider whether the United States is adequately preparing for the kinds of conflicts it is most likely to face: not large-scale conventional wars, but persistent competition through indirect conflict. The academic foundation for the episode is the following article: Kyle Atwell and David Logan (2026), “Shadow Wars in the Shadow of the Bomb: The Link Between Nuclear Weapons and Indirect Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution.

General Richard D. Clarke, US Army, retired, served as the twelfth commander of US Special Operations Command. He previously served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, commandant of cadets at West Point, and director of operations at Joint Special Operations Command.

Dr. David Logan is an assistant professor in security studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His research focuses on nuclear weapons, arms control, deterrence, and the US-China security relationship.

Dr. Kyle Atwell is an Army Special Forces officer and co-founder and chair of the board of the Irregular Warfare Initiative. He is a former assistant professor at West Point and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Alexandra Chinchilla is the host for this episode. Please reach out to her with any questions about the episode or IWI.

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

This episode examines why the United States has failed at irregular warfare and what it would take to reverse that trajectory—not merely to deter, but to actually win. 

Summary

While irregular warfare is on the rise around the globe today, the United States has largely failed at irregular warfare over the past 75 years. Key issues our guests identify include a military oriented for conventional war, inconsistent knowledge and education about irregular warfare, as well as the lack of a dedicated US government organization that can increase interagency cooperation along with a focus on preparing the operational environment. The guests discuss the resilience and resistance model as a way of thinking about politics, with every state having some element of both resistance and resilience. Understanding these tensions within states reveals opportunities for US foreign policy to work with partners and undermine adversaries. Finally, the episode closes with a discussion of irregular warfare in deterrence and competition.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Charles T. Cleveland is a native of Arizona and a 1978 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. His military career included distinguished assignments, most notably Commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (Task Force Viking), Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as Commanding General of Special Operations Command Central, before culminating as the three-star Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command from 2012-2015. In that position, he led the overhaul of U.S. Army Special Operations, which improved the effectiveness and training levels of existing units, built needed capability, and improved relationships within the Army, across other government agencies, in Congress, and among international Special Operations Forces partners.

Dr. Rob Burrell is a Senior Research Fellow with Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida. From 2020-2024, he taught irregular warfare at Joint Special Operations University. He is a retired Marine and has a PhD in history from the University of Warwick. A prominent expert on resistance and resilience, he is the lead author of the first textbook on irregular warfare Resilience and Resistance: Interdisciplinary Lessons in Competition, Deterrence, and Irregular Warfare (Joint Special Operations University Press 2025) which forms the basis for today’s episode.

Alexandra Chinchilla and Kyle Atwell are the hosts for episode 157. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

Description

Episode 156 examines what the U.S.-Iran War and Russia-Ukraine War reveal about how weaker states and irregular actors contest navies, maritime commerce, and global energy flows.

Summary

This conversation examines naval irregular warfare in an era of drones, shadow fleets, contested chokepoints, and attacks on commercial shipping. The guests explore why the maritime domain is attractive to weaker states and irregular actors, comparing Iran’s approach in the Strait of Hormuz, Ukraine’s campaign in the Black Sea, and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. They also discuss ghost fleets, sanctions enforcement, and the risks of mixing warfighting, law enforcement, and freedom of navigation. Throughout, they emphasize that technology matters most when paired with ingenuity, strategy, and a clear end state.

Takeaways

Naval irregular warfare is not new; mines, small boats, commerce raiding, deception, and coastal attacks have long been part of maritime competition.

Unmanned systems, cheap sensors, long-range fires, spoofing, and commercial data add new layers to older maritime threats.

The maritime domain is attractive to irregular actors because trade, energy, food, communications, ports, and undersea infrastructure are difficult to defend and easy to disrupt.

Commercial shipping can be as strategically important as naval forces because disrupting trade can create economic and political effects far beyond the immediate battlefield.

Chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal allow relatively small actions to generate disproportionate global consequences.

Ukraine’s Black Sea campaign shows that a state without a conventional surface fleet can still contest the sea by integrating drones, missiles, intelligence, targeting, and adaptation.

Iran’s maritime strategy relies on asymmetric tools such as small boats, mines, drones, dark shipping, proxy-enabled experimentation, and the threat of disruption in confined waters.

Ghost fleets, spoofed vessel tracking, reflagging, sanctions evasion, and maritime interdiction create hard legal and operational problems for the United States and its allies.

Boarding suspect vessels is not enough; policymakers need a clear legal basis, a clear “then what,” and a strategy that does not undermine freedom of navigation.

U.S. and allied navies need to focus on threat tactics as much as threat technologies, especially the combined use of drones, missiles, mines, small boats, and commercial vessels.

Platform flexibility, modularity, amphibious capacity, and agile force design may matter as much as any single new technology or class of unmanned system.

Tactical success does not equal strategic success. Shooting down drones or destroying vessels matters only if it helps keep seas open and achieves the larger political objective.

Dr. Ben Connable is the Executive Director of the Battle Research Group, an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, and an on-call principal research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses. A retired Marine Corps intelligence and Middle East foreign area officer, he previously served as a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and is the author of Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War.

Dr. Ian M. Ralby is president of Auxilium Worldwide and founder and CEO of I.R. Consilium. He is a leading expert on maritime law, maritime security, ocean governance, maritime domain awareness, hybrid aggression, lawfare, and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. His work supports governments and international organizations confronting piracy, trafficking, smuggling, sanctions evasion, and other maritime security challenges.

Kyle Atwell and Alisa Laufer are the hosts for episode 156. Please reach out to them with any questions about the episode or IWI. 

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for (always free!) access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

All views expressed in this episode are the personal views of the participants and do not represent those of any government agency or of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. 

Intro music: “Unsilenced” by Ketsa

Outro music: “Launch” by Ketsa

Photo: AI-generated photo illustration created for the Irregular Warfare Podcast. The image is illustrative and does not depict an actual event, vessel, or operation.

This week’s episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines how Taiwan could deter—or potentially defeat—a Chinese invasion by transforming the Taiwan Strait into an “unmanned hellscape.” Anchored in the recent CNAS report Hellscape for Taiwan: Rethinking Asymmetric Defense, the conversation explores how drones, autonomous systems, and mobile defenses are reshaping warfare in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing from lessons in Ukraine, the guests argue that cheap, expendable drones offer Taiwan a way to strengthen its longstanding “porcupine strategy” by imposing massive costs on a PLA invasion force during the dangerous amphibious crossing of the Taiwan Strait.

The episode also explores how Taiwan’s geography favors the defender if leveraged correctly. Narrow beaches, mountainous terrain, dense urban areas, and the roughly 100-mile Strait create opportunities for a layered defense built around mines, kamikaze drones, mobile air defenses, and uncrewed maritime systems. At the same time, the guests assess the political and organizational barriers Taiwan faces in implementing a truly asymmetric strategy, arguing that the island’s security may depend less on high-end prestige platforms and more on building a resilient and scalable ecosystem of autonomous systems capable of making invasion prohibitively costly.

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he directs work on cyber, emerging technologies, and Indo-Pacific security. A former PACOM J3 and carrier strike group commander, RADM Montgomery has extensive experience working on Taiwan defense issues and regularly conducts engagements with Taiwanese military officials.

Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn is a senior fellow and director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). A leading expert on defense strategy, drones, and emerging technologies, she is the co-author of Hellscape for Taiwan: Rethinking Asymmetric Defense, which serves as the foundation for today’s discussion.

Ben Jebb is the host for this episode. Please reach out to Ben with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

Episode 154 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines a core puzzle in intrastate conflict: how a small number of foreign fighters can exert outsized influence on insurgencies. Anchored in Professor Tricia Bacon’s The Counterinsurgency Dilemma, this episode explores when foreign fighters strengthen insurgent groups—and when they undermine them. 

While foreign fighters are often associated with higher levels of violence, they typically make up only a small share of insurgent forces. As Bacon argues, this reveals a key insight: local insurgents—not foreign fighters—drive outcomes. They control strategy, resources, and relationships with the population, making them the decisive actors in any insurgency.

Foreign fighters can still provide meaningful advantages. They bring combat experience, specialized skills, and sometimes external funding. Their high risk tolerance and ideological commitment can make groups more aggressive and tactically capable. In fragmented insurgencies, they can even shift the balance of power among rival factions.

However, these benefits come with serious costs. Foreign fighters often lack cultural understanding and local legitimacy, and their preference for extreme violence can alienate civilian populations. Over time, this can strain relationships within insurgent movements, reduce local recruitment, and erode long-term effectiveness.

Drawing on his experience as U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, Steven Schwartz highlights how groups like al-Shabaab evolved from foreign-influenced networks into locally driven organizations. Their durability, he notes, stems less from popular support than from their ability to impose predictable order—often outperforming weak governance alternatives.

Ultimately, the episode reframes foreign fighters as a diagnostic tool rather than the central problem. High levels of foreign fighter influence often signal a weak insurgent group, while limited influence suggests a stronger, locally embedded movement. For practitioners, this distinction matters: effective counterinsurgency must focus on the local dynamics that sustain insurgencies—not just the foreign fighters who draw attention.