History of South Africa podcast

Weather, some say, is fickle. Of course nature is just nature but when you’re on high ground, the mountains, and the weather moves in, the temperature drops in minutes and wind shifts. It is a dangerous place and that’s during mid-summer.

Perhaps summer is the most dangerous time to be caught in a mountain storm, particularly in South Africa because there’s more moisture and freezing sleet and snow sweeps over the summit, overwhelming hikers in shorts and T-shirts.

During January and February 1881, the weather along the Natal escarpment near Volksrust and Majuba was characterized by high rainfall, frequent thunderstorms, thick mist, and cold nights. This period was at the height of the summer rainy season, creating wet, muddy conditions that significantly impacted military operations during the First Boer War.

The weather at times was bitter, just like the Boer sentiment. Laing’s Nek gravesite was desecrated in 1969 when Afrikaner Nationalists under cover of dark, blew up a large Cross that had been erected over the graves of Royal Navy sailors who’d perished during the Battle of Laing’s Nek in February 1881. Such was the depth of historical bitterness.

Memories run deep. The last known Boer of the First Anglo-Boer war, Jacob "Jaap" Coetzer died in the same year as the exploding cross — 1969 - showing just how long veterans of war can live amongst a population that has no clue about their past. A vet of the first Anglo-Boer War had lived to hear Beatles music. Coetzer was 15 year’s old when he joined Commandant Piet Joubert’s commandos in the area of Laings Nek, and was a survivor of the next major clash, Majuba. Not that Jaap Coetzer was in any way linked to the desecration.

Laing’s Nek lies on the N11, a quick 20 minute drive through this pass and you ascend from the rolling hills of KZN into the highground of Mpumalanga — or the Transvaal as it was in 1881.

In January 1881, the British force under Major General Sir George Pomeroy Colley moved off from Newcastle after his ultimatum to the Boers had been ignored.

Despite his intelligence and administrative competence, his battlefield record would reveal a critical weakness: a tendency to apply textbook European tactics in environments where they were increasingly obsolete.

The Boers, by contrast, were armed with modern Westley Richards breech-loading rifles and other similar breech-loading firearms, which allowed for faster and more accurate fire than the older muzzle-loading weapons that had shaped earlier British tactics. Many Boers were also skilled marksmen, accustomed to hunting and irregular warfare, and they fought from concealed positions—rocks, ridges, and scrub—rather than in formal lines. This combination of mobility, cover, and firepower was going to be devastating.

Colley led 1216 officers and men including five companies of the 58th Regiment, 5 companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 60th Rifles, 150 cavalrymen, a party of Royal Navy sailors with two 7 pound guns, and a mounted unit of Royal Artillery with four 9 pound guns. Major General Colley was determined to revenge the previous month’s debacle at Bronkhorstpruit.

The Boers setup four main laagers on the escarpment north east of Majuba. Their main camp was based at a point south of the Standerton Road, about 10 kilometers from Wakkerstroom. From here, flanking the two roads which approached from Newcastle, their patrols could ride out to watch the Buffalo River fords, as well as Laing’s Nek.

Colley had moved off from Newcastle on the 24th January, after two days of heavy rain held up his wagons. On the 25th they struggled across the Imbazane River, and on the 26th, crossed the Ingogo River. British patrols saw Boers moving on the pass, and on the evening of the 27th, noted that Laings Nek was occupied in force. More heavy rain fell that day, and a thick mist drifted across the landscape.

On the morning of the 28th, Colley led his force out of the laager.

Weather, some say, is fickle. Of course nature is just nature but when you’re on high ground, the mountains, and the weather moves in, the temperature drops in minutes and wind shifts. It is a dangerous place and that’s during mid-summer.

Perhaps summer is the most dangerous time to be caught in a mountain storm, particularly in South Africa because there’s more moisture and freezing sleet and snow sweeps over the summit, overwhelming hikers in shorts and T-shirts.

During January and February 1881, the weather along the Natal escarpment near Volksrust and Majuba was characterized by high rainfall, frequent thunderstorms, thick mist, and cold nights. This period was at the height of the summer rainy season, creating wet, muddy conditions that significantly impacted military operations during the First Boer War.

The weather at times was bitter, just like the Boer sentiment. Laing’s Nek gravesite was desecrated in 1969 when Afrikaner Nationalists under cover of dark, blew up a large Cross that had been erected over the graves of Royal Navy sailors who’d perished during the Battle of Laing’s Nek in February 1881. Such was the depth of historical bitterness.

Memories run deep. The last known Boer of the First Anglo-Boer war, Jacob "Jaap" Coetzer died in the same year as the exploding cross — 1969 - showing just how long veterans of war can live amongst a population that has no clue about their past. A vet of the first Anglo-Boer War had lived to hear Beatles music. Coetzer was 15 year’s old when he joined Commandant Piet Joubert’s commandos in the area of Laings Nek, and was a survivor of the next major clash, Majuba. Not that Jaap Coetzer was in any way linked to the desecration.

Laing’s Nek lies on the N11, a quick 20 minute drive through this pass and you ascend from the rolling hills of KZN into the highground of Mpumalanga — or the Transvaal as it was in 1881.

In January 1881, the British force under Major General Sir George Pomeroy Colley moved off from Newcastle after his ultimatum to the Boers had been ignored.

Despite his intelligence and administrative competence, his battlefield record would reveal a critical weakness: a tendency to apply textbook European tactics in environments where they were increasingly obsolete.

The Boers, by contrast, were armed with modern Westley Richards breech-loading rifles and other similar breech-loading firearms, which allowed for faster and more accurate fire than the older muzzle-loading weapons that had shaped earlier British tactics. Many Boers were also skilled marksmen, accustomed to hunting and irregular warfare, and they fought from concealed positions—rocks, ridges, and scrub—rather than in formal lines. This combination of mobility, cover, and firepower was going to be devastating.

Colley led 1216 officers and men including five companies of the 58th Regiment, 5 companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 60th Rifles, 150 cavalrymen, a party of Royal Navy sailors with two 7 pound guns, and a mounted unit of Royal Artillery with four 9 pound guns. Major General Colley was determined to revenge the previous month’s debacle at Bronkhorstpruit.

The Boers setup four main laagers on the escarpment north east of Majuba. Their main camp was based at a point south of the Standerton Road, about 10 kilometers from Wakkerstroom. From here, flanking the two roads which approached from Newcastle, their patrols could ride out to watch the Buffalo River fords, as well as Laing’s Nek.

Colley had moved off from Newcastle on the 24th January, after two days of heavy rain held up his wagons. On the 25th they struggled across the Imbazane River, and on the 26th, crossed the Ingogo River. British patrols saw Boers moving on the pass, and on the evening of the 27th, noted that Laings Nek was occupied in force. More heavy rain fell that day, and a thick mist drifted across the landscape.

On the morning of the 28th, Colley led his force out of the laager.

The British had instigated a war in the Transvaal which fired off in early 1881, but they had already ignited another flashpoint - in Basutoland. This was a fascinating conflict, and it has modern overtones. For the new British government of Sir William Gladstone, the fact they had stimulated a simultaneous slew of conflicts in South Africa was more than irksome, it was expensive and ill-timed.

While Britain was dealing with a humiliating setback against the Boers, it was struggling to enforce authority in Basutoland—highlighting how imperial control was both stretched and inconsistent in southern Africa.

Following Basutoland's transformation into a British dominion on 12 March 1868, it became the target of rapid westernization efforts by the Cape Colony administration. By 1879, the Cape Parliament had extended the Peace Preservation Act to Basutoland, with the aim of disarming the people of the territory.

This did not go down well. Guns, like horses, were of immense significance in Basotho society. Most Basotho who worked on the Kimberley Diamond fields bought both muskets, and later rifles, as well as Boer ponies and other horses before making their way home. What was going on in the minds of the Cape Colony, and those in the imperial colonial office?

It is important for our story to understand global events of the time. For decades all of the European governments concerned with the coast of Africa, both east and west, had tacitly agreed not to allow the quarrels of their respective traders and officials to become occasions for empire. That was the theory.

The ministries in Paris and London wanted nothing more than to continue their gentleman’s agreement, although each suspected the other of wanting to break it. Napoleon the third had nourished a few sporadic projects for African expansion, but the catastrophe of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 had slowed them down. The French Third Republic pulled out of the Ivory Coast and was considering renouncing all options in Dahomey. It wanted to leave Gabon as well as the Congo.

But Senegal was another matter. The French colonial government in Daka had developed a local expansive programme derived mainly from the French army’s influence rather than pure economics. There were plans to build a major railway line to the upper Niger River which would link Senegal to Niger. The French rulers of Senegal were expanding eastwards as well as southwards, and had begun to encircle Gambia.

All of these moves in Africa must be recognized as part of our story here in South Africa.

Globally speaking, the main British nightmare was the Russian advance towards the Dardanelles, Turkey, Persia, India and China. So the British maintained a navy allied with Turkish armies in the near east to protect the Indian route through the Suez against the Russians.

London allied with the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II who ruled greater Turkey and his subordinate Khedive Ismail of Egypt. They were being schmoozed as reliable vassals who served Britain’s financial and imperial interests. Britain could avoid seizing territory directly which would be expensive and politically ruinous. No boots on the ground, just deploy the one-step away approach via their the navy it was thought.

The Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid ii however had been borrowing heavily from the English and even more from the French, while his revenues fell short of expenditure, and debt mounted so he raised land tax. Christians in Bosnia and Herzogovina revolted against Turkish rule, more loans defaulted, and the Sultan, and therefore the Turkish Ottomans, went bankrupt.

With that as the backdrop, let’s return to the Basutoland Gun War.

Tension had been growing for many years between the Basuto and the British. The southern corner of Basutoland was settled by the Baphuthi led by chief Moorosi who had been a tributary ruler of Moshoeshoe. In 1869 he had agreed, somewhat reluctantly, to merge his territory with British Basutoland.

The approach by the English political parties of the time to the young Boer Republics was confused, and even contradictory. William Gladstone, a liberal, had succeeded in ousting the Tory’s under Benjamin Disraeli in his famous Midlothian Campaign of 1879 and 1880. In 1880 Gladstone formed his second ministry and almost immediately, the promises he’d made about foreswearing foreign wars were broken.

There is a direct link between what was going on in South Africa and in Ireland. These two territories, so far apart geographically, featured as joint threats in the English mind of the time. The most direct link is Gladstone himself. He had criticized the annexation of the Transvaal during his Midlothian Campaign, but once in power, he hesitated to reverse British policy, fearing a domino effect where weakness in Pretoria would lead to revolution in Dublin.

By 1880, the Irish Nationalists began to see the Boers not just as fellow farmers, but as fellow victims of British coercion. This Irish link flourished throughout the 19th and part of the 20th Century with Irish Nationalists fighting both for the Boers during the Second Anglo-Boer War.

The shift in Irish nationalist alignment was driven by a move from anti-imperial solidarity to human rights internationalism. Initially, the Irish supported the Boers as fellow "peasant-republicans" fighting the British Empire, but as the 20th century progressed, the Irish Republican movement increasingly identified with the ANC, viewing the struggle against Apartheid as a mirror to their own fight against institutionalized discrimination in Northern Ireland. By the height of the Cold War, the Irish Republican Army’s Marxist-leaning leadership saw the Afrikaner government as a pro-Western, colonialist proxy, leading them to provide tactical advice and training to Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) to help dismantle the very state they had once ideologically championed.

But at first, they were close allies in both spirit and in their political expression. The South African crisis which led to the first Boer War of 1880 and 1881, occurred because the British government claimed to be the paramount authority and trustee of South Africa, and the Boers rejected this claim.

Earlier, in 1878, Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert had sailed to London with a petition signed by over 6,500 Boers demanding the reversal of the Transvaal annexation. Sir Michael Hicks Beach had just taken over as Colonial Secretary from the more diplomatic and polite Lord Carnarvon. Hicks-Beach was nicknamed Black Michael, referring to his famously long, dark beard, his tall, thin, imposing frame, and his legendary dark temper. He was known for being abrasive, combative, and having very little patience for those who didn't respect British authority.

To the English, it seemed that South Africa was on the verge of becoming another Ireland, the inveterate hostility of whose people might only be held down at tremendous cost by main force. Gladstone and his cabinet grappled with one main question.

In both territories, Transvaal and Ireland, should a nationalist reaction be met with coercion, or concession?

The Bapedi have a rich and textured history, as with most of South Africa’s past, where religion and tradition are entwined to create a consciousness of life that is attractive to the naturally curious.

Today, part of Limpopo Province bushveld contains private game parks with Bapedi and other African names — including Moya which has three meanings. It is used for wind, or breath, or the soul, roughly translated. It is something they say which cannot be seen, but can be heard. When a sick person wheezes, you know they’re alive, because you can hear their soul, it has not departed. At night, when there is stillness, and you pick up the faint sounds of someone speaking, and upon investigation you find noone, then you know it is the soul of a dead person.

Parts of your body are Moya, the lungs, blood, heart, liver, kidneys, and sex organs, your head and your hair. It is also these parts which are mostly associated with or susceptible to, disease. Your Moya is like your iris, or your fingerprint, there is noone else who has a copy of your Moya.

While humans cannot live without Moya, sometimes it can live without their seriti, your shadow and reflection but this is the supernatural representation. The Bapedi word for shadow and a reflection in water or a mirror is Moriti.

Your Seriti is created at birth, when you cast your first shadow. For extremely traditional Bapedi, it is bad manners to step on anothers shadow, or allow your shadow to fall on someone else. Traditional healers therefore won’t work at midday when the sun is directly overhead, because it is said, the spirits of the dead are sleeping.

Chief Sekhukhune of the Bapedi knew this when he built his fortress in a steep sided narrow valley south of the Olifants River at what was called his Stat.

While the British were focusing on the Zulu’s in 1879, Sekhukhune was sparring with other English authorities along the Olifants, and the towns of Lydenburg and Middelburg were reinforced. The Bapedi Chief wanted to expand his territory across the Steelpoort River and his raiding parties were bothering the Boers there. His position was further strengthened by a drought which meant British and Boer commandos could not take to the field, there wasn’t enough grass and water for their oxen and horses. The dreaded horse sickness had also broken out, further complicating the Transvaal Government’s plans.According to the blueprint for the Transvaal that had been devised by administrator Theophilos Shepstone and Cape Governor Sir Bartle Frere, the defeat of the Bapedi would be proof to the Boers of the British good faith. It would demonstrate that British rule was a blessing.

To their considerable astonishment, this act actually put the final nail in the coffin of confederation as the Cambridge History of South Africa puts it. Since the British took control of the Cape in 1805, their policy had been grounded in the belief that once the won allegiance of the Dutch and Huguenot settler population, peace and prosperity would be guaranteed.