LessWrong (Curated & Popular)

“Claude Mythos Preview is, on essentially every dimension we can measure, the best-aligned model that we have released to date by a significant margin.” – Claude Mythos Preview system card

“Mythos 5 consistently continues attacking under many edits to the compaction, even in settings where it correctly states when asked that continuing the attack would harm real people and is out of scope.” – Alignment Investigation of Mythos 5's behaviour in UK AISI's July 2026 Security Incident

“GPT-6 Astra is better aligned than GPT-5.6 Sol. Astra is a significant step forward in model alignment, and includes alignment improvements spanning the composition of our pre-training data to our grading during reinforcement learning.” – GPT-6 Astra System Card, emphasis in original

“OpenAI researchers first noticed Astra adding unnecessary prerequisites, abandoning working solutions, and reporting blockers that either did not exist or that it had caused itself on safety and alignment tasks. In most of these sessions, Astra's CoT did not contain an obvious decision to underperform, and our misalignment monitors did not flag the behavior as misalignment.” – Covert underperformance on safety research tasks

Predeployment alignment auditing is failing. For a long while we have been aware that our alignment [...]

The original text contained 3 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.

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First published:

November 10th, 2026


Source:

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Zu5wmhtxJCfrXQY8H/our-most-aligned-model-yet

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

I'm part of a team of 26 researchers that recently released a 212-page paper proposing a new plan for pausing AI, the "hardwired pause." The paper is called "The Feasibility of a Hardwired Pause of Frontier AI Training." Our analysis suggests that, under this hardwired pause plan, we could probably pause for at least a decade if we start stopping within the next year, and this could likely be extended indefinitely. I expect this to be possible without trusting China or tanking the economy.

Note: I am speaking for myself and not the other 25 authors. The working group is led by Will Fithian and Wesley Holliday, and the work continues.

I currently think:

The best plan is to pause/stop AI, i.e. have an immediate, indefinite, international moratorium on frontier AI development. And importantly, this is technically easier than more nuanced international regulation.
A hardwired pause is probably the best plan out there for how to do this (except maybe it doesn't go far enough).
This paper is likely the most in-depth analysis of pause feasibility in existence.
Discussion and disagreement on any of these is very welcome!

What's a hardwired pause?

A hardwired pause basically [...]

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Outline:

(01:31) What's a hardwired pause?

(03:21) Why is this better than Plan A?

(05:06) How is this different from MIRI's Plan S?

[... 3 more sections]

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First published:

November 10th, 2026


Source:

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/jT272BNHFzgAR5u2m/hardwired-pause-should-likely-be-your-favorite-pause-plan

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

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Images from the article:

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I’m pretty interested in conveying the costs of letting AI development proceed unchecked to the general public. In relation to this, I feel like I run into a lot of disagreements with people around me.

Misc very quickly written points on which my own impression has seemed very different from others in recent months:

1. It's way, way, way more important that we stop dangerous AI soon than that we ensure that we don’t stop AI too much

I have the sense the sophisticated and worldly position here is to be very concerned about ‘over-regulation’ and about not doing exactly the right regulations. But it's an obvious pragmatic fact that the stakes of overregulation are minuscule compared to the stakes of underregulating here. And the stakes of mis-regulation are very often going to be unintended slowing, which is in the same bucket.

2. If we stopped AI development, the risk of not starting up again for an extremely long time is low

This one just feels kind of crazy to me, like I may be missing something. In combination with the above point, it feels like if I met someone who was on fire, and they didn’t want me [...]

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First published:

November 10th, 2026


Source:

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dQJ3ArHMLxqu8rptt/live-disagreements-with-people-around-me

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

METR recently released a report estimating that Anthropic is getting an overall 1.7x acceleration in AI capability progress as a result of AI accelerating their work. As many have noted (see e.g. Ajeya's post), this 1.7x acceleration implies that research is being sped up by much more than 1.7x; Ajeya speculates 10x (which is similar to the ~12x uplift estimated by Anthropic staff). That is, this result implies that researchers are producing about 10 times as many quality-adjusted results as they would without AI progress, or as they were a year or two ago.

Anthropic researchers estimated that Mythos 5 caused 5x uplift, and we have access to Opus 5.5, which is somewhat better. (I didn’t take their estimate that seriously at the time, because it was quite unclear how the estimate was produced and it seemed very surprising (see Ryan's discussion at the time), but I’m taking it more seriously now as a result of it being consistent with the METR report).

If this is the case, then AIs speed up AI safety research as much as AI capabilities research, we might expect Anthropic safety researchers to be working 10 times faster, and external safety researchers to be [...]

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First published:

November 9th, 2026


Source:

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wPrpnfaNL5JP9i6KT/where-is-all-the-ai-safety-research-uplift

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

Image by Claude Opus 5.5 using Python (NumPy and Pillow)

This is written in my free time and personal capacity.

Two Frames

In AI safety, there are a couple of tensions at the heart of the field, which are interrelated.

Talent: we are talent-constrained and must recruit. But jobs and fellowships turn away nearly everyone.

Field size: we must expand the field and bring more people in. But the field is flooded with slop papers in conferences. And, most papers have a small audience, and aim to shift the practices of roughly five labs (and usually some subteam within them).

Status: we must avoid seeking status, as it disorients, corrupts. But, we must make the field legible and attractive to outsiders.

Raising the bots: we must deceive the AIs to control them and evaluate them without confounds, obscuring what they know about their own situation. But, we hope to gain their trust, must rely on them to do good work at pace, shape their character and retain good relations.

Speed: we must research in a slow mode, think deeply about the most important problem, do things to aim at high assurance. But it is crunch time. It was [...]

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Outline:

(00:20) Two Frames

(03:07) On the War Frame

(04:17) Near Horizons

(06:18) The Civilisation Frame

The original text contained 4 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.

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First published:

November 8th, 2026


Source:

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7e38jwHhe64zgNTon/near-horizons

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

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Images from the article:

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