The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

This episode is the 14th episode in our Guadalcanal series.  We look at the Battle of Henderson Field, which is the decisive terrain for the campaign.  Had the airfield been lost, it is likely that the US would not have been able to hold Guadalcanal.
We discuss:
How do you defend critical terrain against a numerically superior force?
How should defensive positions exploit terrain to maximize effectiveness?
How do you integrate combined arms in the defense?
How does poor communication affect tactical coordination? 
How do you integrate unfamiliar units into ongoing operations?

The 164th got their introduction into combat at Henderson Field.  They were a North Dakota National Guard unit and had only been on Guadalcanal for 10 days.  They were bought up to bolster the heavily outnumbered defences.  Rather than have the unit deploy into the line and take over a part of the line, Puller had small groups lead into their positions next to Marines.  Piecemeal deployment, the last thing you want to happen to your Regiment, but it employed the green troops to fight next to seasoned Marines.  At the end of the fight, Chesty Puller said, "These farm boys can fight!"
*]:pointer-events-auto [content-visibility:auto] supports-[content-visibility:auto]:[contain-intrinsic-size:auto_100lvh] scroll-mt-[calc(var(--header-height)+min(200px,max(70px,20svh)))]" dir="auto" tabindex="-1" data-turn-id= "59f613f3-b8a9-420c-bd76-32fbc72206af" data-testid= "conversation-turn-4" data-scroll-anchor="true" data-turn= "assistant"> Check out the show notes for the Guadalcanal series.






https://www.patreon.com/cw/principlesofwar - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.

Looking for YouTube PME videos?  Check out the Principles of War YouTube Channel.

Great Professional Military Education for your Unit.  This episode covers static defence, combined arms, terrain and leadership.

This episode looks at the Sumiyoshi's tank attack across the Matanikau - an attempt to draw defenders away from the perimeter of Henderson Field.  We also discuss why Muryama coundn;t synchronise his forces and the dysfunction within the Japanese Headquarters.  
We look at - 
What are the consequences of relieving a subordinate commander on the eve of battle? (And what role did Tsuji play in Kawaguchi's dismissal?)
What happens when multiple attacking elements operate independently without coordination?
How should armour, infantry, and artillery be coordinated in an assault?
What is the value of pre-registered artillery fires in defense?
How can the Japanese achieve tactical surprise despite proximity?
What is the purpose and risk of outposts forward of the main defensive line?

 Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police.  He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.
*]:pointer-events-auto [content-visibility:auto] supports-[content-visibility:auto]:[contain-intrinsic-size:auto_100lvh] scroll-mt-[calc(var(--header-height)+min(200px,max(70px,20svh)))]" dir="auto" tabindex="-1" data-turn-id= "59f613f3-b8a9-420c-bd76-32fbc72206af" data-testid= "conversation-turn-4" data-scroll-anchor="true" data-turn= "assistant"> Check out the show notes for the Guadalcanal series.






https://www.patreon.com/cw/principlesofwar - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.

Looking for YouTube PME videos?  Check out the Principles of War YouTube Channel.

Great Professional Military Education for your Unit.  This episode covers co-operation, the employment of armour and command dysfunction.

This episode looks at the defensive and offensive planning undertaken by the IJA and the USMC.  It also looks closely at Vandegrift's meeting with Halsey and the outcome of the meeting.  This is a pivotal moment in the campaign.  Halsey has taken over from Ghormley and he prepares to back Vandegrift with everything the Navy has to help defend Guadalcanal.
How does intelligence fusion enable a commander to choose the time and place of battle? The combination of coast-watchers, aerial photography, signals intercepts, prisoner interrogation, and traffic analysis gives Vandegrift sufficient warning to disengage from the Matanikau and assume a prepared defensive posture before the Japanese assault begins.
What are the compounding effects of logistics failure on combat power? Japanese soldiers carry only five days' rations for a march that takes far longer than planned. By the time the assault goes in, troops are hungry, exhausted, and degraded — before they have fired a shot.
How does the defence leverage knowledge of terrain? The defenders have patrolled and observed their ground for months, have pre-registered every likely approach, and understand the avenues of attack in detail — advantages the attacking Japanese, navigating by inaccurate maps in pitch darkness, completely lack.
What is the relationship between strategic commitment and tactical success? The Marines' ability to hold Henderson Field is directly tied to whether higher command is willing to accept naval losses to keep the sea lanes open. Halsey's personal commitment to "give you all I have" is the strategic enabler for everything that follows tactically.
How does the defender's advantage of fighting on familiar ground translate into combat power? Vandegrift's troops are dug in, know their sectors, have rehearsed their fire plans, and can rotate reserves along interior lines — while the Japanese are exhausted, disoriented, under-supplied, and attacking in darkness across ground they have never seen.
Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police.  He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.
*]:pointer-events-auto [content-visibility:auto] supports-[content-visibility:auto]:[contain-intrinsic-size:auto_100lvh] scroll-mt-[calc(var(--header-height)+min(200px,max(70px,20svh)))]" dir="auto" tabindex="-1" data-turn-id= "59f613f3-b8a9-420c-bd76-32fbc72206af" data-testid= "conversation-turn-4" data-scroll-anchor="true" data-turn= "assistant"> Check out the show notes for the Guadalcanal series.






https://www.patreon.com/cw/principlesofwar - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.

Great Professional Military Education for your Unit.  This episode covers economy of effort, intelligence fusion, and defensive fires planning.

This episode looks at the IJN and IJA combined planning for the assault on Henderson's Field, including the naval gunfire from the Kongo and Haruna under Rear Admiral Kurita where 973 14-inch rounds were fired in 83 minutes.  We also discuss the development of the Maruyama Trail for the approach march of the 2nd Sendai Division.

This episode discusses:
What happens when commanders visualise terrain from a distance rather than conduct ground reconnaissance?
How does poor mapping degrade operational planning?
How does confirmation bias infect intelligence assessment?
What is the relationship between terrain and combat power?
What munition selection tells us about the limits of naval gunfire support against land targets? 
How do you maximise the effect of a fire support mission through observation planning? 
What does the Henderson Field bombardment teach us about fire saturation and its psychological effects? 
How does loss of aviation fuel translate directly into loss of air superiority? 
What is the danger of planning based on the timeline you want rather than the timeline the terrain imposes? 

Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police.  He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.
*]:pointer-events-auto [content-visibility:auto] supports-[content-visibility:auto]:[contain-intrinsic-size:auto_100lvh] scroll-mt-[calc(var(--header-height)+min(200px,max(70px,20svh)))]" dir="auto" tabindex="-1" data-turn-id= "59f613f3-b8a9-420c-bd76-32fbc72206af" data-testid= "conversation-turn-4" data-scroll-anchor="true" data-turn= "assistant"> Check out the show notes for the Guadalcanal series.






https://www.patreon.com/cw/principlesofwar - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.

Great Professional Military Education for your Unit.  This episode covers the Command and Control and generating combined arms.

USMC 1st Marine Division vs the IJA 2nd (Sendai) Division in the fight to control the Matanikau River.
The 3rd Battle of the Matanikau Part II - This is the tenth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland.
This episode discusses:
 1st Marine Division Combined Arms integration at the Third Battle of the Matanikau?
How did the loss of the Matanikau River crossing have on planning for the assault on Henderson Field?
How did Japanese command and control failures at the battalion and regimental level contribute to their defeat at the Third Matanikau?
What are the tactical lessons from Marine Corps fire support coordination?
How did weather and terrain shape manoeuvre and command and control?
How did the Marines use reverse slope positions and indirect machine gun fire to defeat Japanese delaying forces?
What were the contrasting night combat doctrines of the USMC and the Imperial Japanese Army?
How did delayed battlefield reporting and communications breakdown affect IJA operational decision-making?
What is the operational significance of denying an enemy its artillery firing platforms, as demonstrated at the Third Battle of the Matanikau?
How did Lt Gen Hyakutake manage two simultaneous campaigns — Guadalcanal and the Kokoda withdrawal — from an austere forward headquarters in October 1942?
How did American air superiority over Henderson Field shape Japanese logistics and sea control during the Guadalcanal campaign?
What role did intelligence integration — coast watchers, signals intercepts, and radar — play in Allied air defence during the Guadalcanal campaign?
Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police.  He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.
*]:pointer-events-auto [content-visibility:auto] supports-[content-visibility:auto]:[contain-intrinsic-size:auto_100lvh] scroll-mt-[calc(var(--header-height)+min(200px,max(70px,20svh)))]" dir="auto" tabindex="-1" data-turn-id= "59f613f3-b8a9-420c-bd76-32fbc72206af" data-testid= "conversation-turn-4" data-scroll-anchor="true" data-turn= "assistant"> Check out the show notes for the Guadalcanal series.






https://www.patreon.com/cw/principlesofwar - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.

Great Professional Military Education for your Unit.  This episode covers the Command and Control and generating combined arms.